The availability of vast amounts of data is changing how we can make medical discoveries, predict global market trends, save energy, and develop new educational strategies. In certain settings such as Genome Wide Association Studies or deep learning, the sheer size of data (patient files or labeled examples) seems critical to making discoveries. When data is held distributedly by many parties, as often is the case, they must share it to reap its full benefits.
INTRODUCTION
The availability of vast amounts of data is affecting how we can make medical discoveries, predict global market trends, save energy, improve our infrastructures, and develop new educational strategies. Indeed, it is is becoming clearer that sample size may be the most important factor in making surprising new discoveries, in areas such as genome-wide association studies (GWAS) in order to identify genetic variants that are associated with a given trait [7, 18, 11] 1 and the success of deep learning in machine learning.
When large amounts of data are required, parts of the data are often held by different entities. Such entities need to share their data, or at least engage in a collaborative computation where each entity manages its own private data, in order for society to reap the benefit of large sample sizes. Referring back to the GWAS example, success is often explicitly attributed to such collaboration: "The schizophrenia study was made possible due to unusually large scale collaborations among many institutes... This level of cooperation between institutions is absolutely essential... If we are to continue elucidating the biology of psychiatric disease through genomic research, we must continue to work together." [15] The above example seems an exception rather than the rule. A major obstacle to the big-data revolution is so-called "data hoarding". One reason is privacy concerns, where parties refuse to collaborate in order to protect the privacy of their data. Privacy, however, is not the only obstacle.
An equally important obstacle is competition between entities holding data. When access to data carries tangible rewards (say, if the entities are companies competing for a share of the same market or research laboratories competing for scientific credit), it is unclear whether an individual collaborator is better off by collaborating, even if it is clear that better overall conclusions can be drawn from collaboration. Stated in more game-theoretic terms, the entities face the following dilemma which is the topic of this paper: whereas the overall societal benefit of collaboration is clear, the utility for an individual collaborator may be negative, so why collaborate?
In Section 2, we present a formal model for collaboration in which this question can be analyzed, as well as design mechanisms to enable collaboration where all collaborators are provably "better off", when possible. The order in which collaborators receive the outputs of a collaboration will be a crucial aspect of our model and mechanisms. For example, in the scientific research community, data sharing can translate to losing a prior publication date. In financial enterprises, the timing of investments and stock trading can translate to large financial gains or losses.
We show in Section 3 that the collaboration mechanisms we develop can be implemented in a decentralized way by n distrustful parties even in the presence of a subset of colluding polynomial time parties who may deviate in an arbitrary fashion, under standard cryptographic assumptions. To achieve this we extend the theory of multi-party computation (MPC) to impose order and time on the delivery of outputs to different players.
Detailed summary of contributions

A model of collaboration
We propose a model for collaboration which enables the determination of whether the utility obtained by a collaborator outweighs the utility he may obtain without collaboration. The ultimate desired outcome of a collaboration is to learn a parameter of the (unknown) joint distribution from which the participants' input data x1, . . . , xn is drawn. This can be expressed as y * = f (X ) where X is the joint distribution of input data and f is a known function. In our model, the outcome of a collaboration is a pair (π, Z) where π is a permutation of player identities and Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) where each Z π(i) is a distribution that corresponds to player i's "estimate" of y * . We think of Z π(i) as the public output of player i: for example, in the setting of scientific collaboration, Z π(i) would be player i's academic publication. Our model setup assumes an underlying score function which assigns scores to the players' outputs.
The model includes a reward function Rt which characterizes the gain in utility for any given party i in a collaboration. The reward that a party i gets depends on how much his score s(Z π(i) ) improves on the previous state of the art s(Z π(i)−1 ), and on π(i), namely, when the party makes his public output. Specifically, the reward function includes a multiplicative discount factor β t where β ∈ [0, 1] and t is the time of publication, meaning that the reward from a publication is "discounted" more as time goes on.
Rt(π, Z) = β t · (s(Z π(t−1) ) − s(Z π(t) ))
To determine whether the utility of collaboration outweighs the utility of working alone, our model uses "outside payoff" values αi which are the score that party i would obtain without collaborating. αi can be computed directly from the input xi of party i.
Mechanisms and collaborative equilibrium
We define a notion of collaborative equilibrium in which all parties are guaranteed non-negative reward, and develop mechanisms for collaboration that compute such equilibria. When an equilibrium exists, our mechanism delivers a sequence of progressively improving "partial information" about y * to the collaborating parties. More specifically, the mechanism takes as input the data of all parties, and outputs a pair (π, Y) where π is a permutation of player identities and Y = (Y1, , . . . , Yn) specifies the outcomes to be delivered to the players: each Y π(i) is the approximation to y * that is given to player i at time-step π(i), such that the score of the outputs is increasing with time. That is, s(Y π(1) ) > · · · > s(Y π(n) ). We emphasize that both π and the outputs Yi are computed based on all players' inputs.
When player i receives an output Y π(i) from the central mechanism, she may combine Y π(i) with the information that she learned from prior public outputs and her own input xi, to generate a public output Z π(i) . We first prove that the ability of the players to learn from others' publications, in general, will make the problem of deciding whether there exists an equilibrium is NP-complete (see Theorem 13) .
Next, we show that there is a polynomial-time mechanism that can output an equilibrium whenever one exists (or output NONE if one does not exist) for a variety of model settings and parameters which we characterize (see Theorem 11) . An example of a setting when a polynomial-time mechanism is possible is when • there is an upper bound µ j on the amount of information that any player can learn from a given player j's publication, and
• it is possible to efficiently compute, for any y * and δ > 0, an "approximation" Y such that s(Y ) = δ.
In a nutshell, the bounds µj are used to define a weighted graph where the weight of the minimum-weight perfect matching determines the existence of a collaborative equilibrium.
Protocols to implement the mechanisms
We develop cryptographic protocols for implementing the mechanisms without a centralized trusted party and in the presence of a subset of colluding players who may deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary fashion, under cryptographic assumptions. The protocols compute the collaboration outcome (π, Y) via multi-party secure computation on players' private inputs. Since a crucial aspect of the mechanism's ability to yield non-negative reward to all players is the delivery of outputs in order, we need to extend the classical notion of MPC to incorporate guarantees on the order and timing of output delivery. These extensions may be of interest independent of the application of mechanisms for incentivizing collaborations.
We define ordered MPC as follows. Let f be an arbitrary n-ary function and p be an n-ary function that outputs permutation [n] → [n]. An ordered MPC protocol is executed by n parties, where each party i ∈ [n] has a private input xi ∈ {0, 1} * , who wish to securely compute f (x1, . . . , xn) = (y1, . . . , yn) where yi is the output of party i. Moreover, the parties are to receive their outputs in a particular ordering dictated by p(x1, . . . , xn) = π where π is a permutation of the player identities. Since the choice of π depends on private inputs, it may leak information: hence, we formulate an enhanced privacy requirement for ordered MPC that each player should learn his output and his own position in the output ordering, and nothing more (see Definition 14) .
We show a simple transformation from classical MPC protocols for general functionalities f to ordered MPC protocols for general functionalities f and permutation functions p that achieve enhanced privacy, even when a minority of the n players are colluding to sabotage the protocol (Theorem 17). The assumptions required are the same as for the classical MPC constructions (e.g. [12] ). When the colluding players are in majority, it is well known that output delivery to all honest parties cannot be guaranteed [10] .
Next, we define timed-delay MPC, where explicit time delays are introduced into the output delivery schedule. Time delays between the outputs may be crucial to enable parties to reap the benefits of their position in the order. We give two constructions of timed-delay MPC in the honest majority setting 2 . First, we give a conceptually simple protocol which runs "dummy rounds" of communication in between issuing outputs to different players, in order to measure time-delays. The simple protocol has the flaw that all (honest) players must continue to interact until the last party receives his output (that is, they must stay online until all the time-delays have elapsed).
To address this issue, we present a second protocol assuming the existence of time-lock puzzles [19] in addition to the classical MPC [12] assumptions (see Theorem 23). Informally, a time-lock puzzle is a primitive which allows "locking" of data, such that it will be released after a prespecified time delay, and no earlier. Our second timed-delay MPC protocol, instead of issuing outputs to players in the clear, gives to each party his output locked into a time-lock puzzle; and in order to enforce the desired ordering, the delays required to unlock the puzzles are set to be an increasing sequence. An issue that arises when giving out time-lock puzzles to many parties is that different parties may have different computing power, and hence solve their puzzles at different speeds: for example, it is clear that we cannot guarantee that players learn their outputs in the desired ordering if some players compute arbitrarily faster than others. Still, we show that our protocol is secure and achieves ordered output delivery in the case that the difference between any two players' computing power is known to be bounded by a logarithmic factor. If the assumption about computing power does not hold, then the protocol still achieves security (i.e. correctness and privacy), but the ordering of outputs is not guaranteed.
The definitions of ordered and timed-delay MPC inspire new notions unrelated to the central topic of this paper.
Time-lines. Inspired by the application of time-lock puzzles to time-delayed MPC, we propose the new concept of a time-line, where multiple data items can be locked so that their unlocking must be serialized in (future) time. See full version [1] for details.
Prefix-fairness. In the traditional MPC landscape, fairness is the one notion that addresses the idea that either all parties participating in an MPC should benefit, or none should. Fairness requires that either all players receive their output, or none do. It is well-known that fairness is achievable when a majority of the players are honest, but it is not achievable for general functionalities when a majority of players are faulty [10] . We propose a refinement of the classical notion of fairness in the setting of ordered MPC, called prefix-fairness, where players are to receive their outputs one after the other according to a given ordering π, and the guarantee is that either no players receive an output or those who do strictly belong to a prefix of the mandated order π (see Definition 16) . Prefix-fairness can be achieved for general functionalities and any number of faulty players, under the same assumptions as classical MPC (Theorem 18).
Discussion and interpretation of our work
Slowing down scientific discovery? Intuitively, the mechanisms we develop always take the following form: the mechanism computes the "best possible estimate" Y * of y * given the input data of the players, and then hands out a sequence of successively more accurate (according to the score function) outcomes, where the final party receives Y * .
One may ask: why slow down scientific progress and hand out inferior results when better ones are available? We argue that progress will in fact be enhanced, not slowed down, by this methodology, as it will be a decisive factor in parties' willingness to collaborate in the first place. This bears great similarity to the original philosophy of differential privacy and privacy-preserving data analysis more generally. In these fields, accuracy (so-called utility) of answers to aggregate queries over items in database is partially sacrificed in order to preserve privacy of individual data items, as a way to encourage individuals to contribute their data items to the database. In an analogous way, in order to get results based on the large data sets held by potential collaborators, we sacrifice the speed of discovery of the "ultimate" collaboration outcome: we are willing to pay this price to incentivize parties to collaborate and contribute their data. In contrast to differential privacy, we do not sacrifice ultimate accuracy. The last collaborator to receive an output, receives the ideal outcome Y * . Namely, Yn = Y * . Fort Lauderdale: the importance of time. A recurring idea in our work is the importance of time and ordering of research discoveries, which is inspired in part by the following striking example from the field of genomics. In the 2003 Fort Lauderdale meeting on large-scale biological research [20] , the gathering of leading researchers in the field recognized that "pre-publication data release can promote the best interests of [the field of genomics]" but "might conflict with a fundamental scientific incentive -publishing the first analysis of one's own data". Researchers at the meeting agreed to adopt a set of principles by which although data is shared upon discovery, researchers hold off publication until the original holder of the data has published a first analysis. Being a close-knit community in which reputation is key, this was a viable agreement which has led to great productivity and advancement of the field. However, more generally, their report states that "incentives should be developed by the scientific community to support the voluntary release of [all sorts of] data prior to publication". This example teaches us to focus on three key aspects of collaboration: the incentive to collaborate has to be clear to all collaborators; there must be a way to ensure adherence to the rules of collaboration; and timing is of the essence. Privacy implies increased utility. Although the goal of our work is to design mechanisms to incentivize collaboration by increasing the utility of collaborations rather than focusing on the privacy of individual entities' input data, MPC protocols prove to be an important technical tool to imple-ment the mechanisms which guarantee increased utility. As a by-product, the use of MPC provides our mechanisms with the additional guarantee of privacy. Future directions. When collaboration is feasible, each party i in our model is guaranteed a reward from collaborating that is greater than the reward αi they could get on their own. However, the contributions of the players' data to the computation of the final output Y * may be asymmetric: some special player i * may have some data that helps solve the "puzzle", but this player i * may not be known a priori before the participants decide to collaborate 3 An interesting future direction would be developing mechanisms where, even without a priori knowledge of which players have higher quality data, we can still design collaborations where the players whose contribution turned out most valuable get most credit.
Another future direction of interest to design truthful mechanisms so that collaborating parties will be provably incentivized to submit their true and accurate data as input. In our work, we assume that, while we can incentivize the players to collaborate or not, once they decide to collaborate they are truthful about the value of their dataset xi. From the point of view of scientific publications, this assumption is reasonable if we believe that the experiments that generate this data can be verified or replicated, and that a failure to replicate would hurt a scientific group's reputation. However, there are many settings, such as businesses pooling their data together to generate larger profits, where the parties may be incentivized to lie about their output xi. Since we are already assuming that parties are rational, a future direction would be to develop mechanisms where, even when parties can lie about xi (because xi cannot be verified by others), they are still incentivized to report it truthfully. One possible direction is where xi is the output of some long #P computation (for example, a Markov Chain Monte-Carlo simulation), where (a) replicating the computation would take a very long time and delay publication for everyone in the group and (b) player i cannot prove in a classical way that their output xi is correct. Even in this case, player i can be incentivized to give the right answer via a rational proof [2, 3, 13] .
Our setting is useful and most likely to lead to collaboration when there are increasing marginal returns from adding new data. It will be interesting to discover new settings where this is provably the case.
Other related work
Banerjee, Goel and Krishnaswamy [4] consider the problem of partial progress sharing, where a scientific task is modeled as a directed acyclic graph of subtasks. Their goal is to minimize the time for all tasks to be completed by selfish agents who may not wish to share partial progress.
Kleinberg and Oren [16] study a model where researchers have different projects, each with a different reward, to choose from. If multiple researchers solve the problem, they study how to split the reward in a socially optimal way. They show that assigning credit asymmetrically can be socially optimal when researchers seek to maximize individual reward, and they suggest implementing a "Matthew Effect", where researchers who are already credit-rich are allocated more credit than in an even-split system. Interestingly, this is coherent with our paper, where it is socially optimal to obfuscate data so that researchers who are already "ahead" (in terms of data), end up "ahead" in terms of credit.
Cai, Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [9] study the problem of incentivizing n players to share data, in order to compute a statistical estimator. Their goal is to minimize the sum of rewards made to the players, as well as the statistical error of their estimator. In contrast, our goal is to give a decentralized mechanism through which players can pool their data, and distribute partial information to themselves in order to increase the utility of every collaborating player.
Boneh and Naor [8] construct timed commitments that can be "forced open" after a certain time delay, and discuss applications of these to achieve fair two-party contract signing (and coin-flipping) under certain timing assumptions including bounded network delay and the assumption of sequentiality of modular exponentiation from [19] .
Due to space constraints, we omit all proofs in this extended abstract. Proofs are given in the full version [1] .
DATA SHARING MODEL
In this section, we present a model for scientific collaboration and analyze mechanisms within it. Our exposition focuses primarily on the setting of scientific collaboration and publication. However, our results apply to more broad collaboration and discovery in general, in which case a "publication" should be thought of as any kind of public output. Notation. We denote by [n] the set {1, . . . , n} of integers between 1 and n, and by [n] → [n] the set of all permutations of [n]. For a set X, we write ∆(X) to denote the set of all distributions over X. The symbol denotes the disjoint union operation. An efficient algorithm is one which runs in probabilistic polynomial time (ppt).
The model
We propose a model of collaboration between n research groups which captures the following features: groups may pool their data, but each group will publish their own results; only results that improve on the "state of the art" may be published; more credit may be given to earlier publications; a group will learn not only from pooling their data with other groups, but also from other groups' publications.
To formalize the intuitions outlined above, we specify a model as follows.
• There is a set [n] of players.
• Each player i has a dataset x i which is sampled as follows.
• For each i ∈ [n], there is a set X i of possible datasets, which is common knowledge. Let X denote X 1 × · · · × Xn. • There is a distribution X ∈ ∆(X) over X, from which the x i are sampled: (x 1 , . . . , xn) ← X . • The distribution X is not known to any of the players, but comes from a commonly known distribution D. That is, X ← D, for some D ∈ ∆(∆(X)). • There is an output space Y , and a function f : ∆(X 1 × · · · × Xn) → Y such thatŷ = f (X ) is the value which the players wish to learn. That is, the players want to learn some property of the unknown distribution X from which their datasets were sampled. Y and f are common knowledge. • Y 0 denotes the distribution ofŷ given f and D .
• There is a score function s : ∆(Y ) → R + , which varies with f and D. The score function s(·) is maximized by the distri-butionŶ which puts probability 1 on the true valueŷ. The score function s is common knowledge.
• We require a natural monotonicity property of the score function. Namely, let Y and Z be any distributions, and let z be a value in the support of Z. Then
where z ← Z denotes the event that z is sampled from the distribution Z.
• Remark. Let {ŷ|x 1 , . . . , xn} denote the distribution ofŷ given certain datasets (x 1 , . . . , xn) ∈ X. A consequence of the monotonicity condition is that given all of the datasets x 1 , . . . , xn of all players in the model, the best achievable score is s ({ŷ|x 1 , . . . , xn}).
• A collaboration outcome is given by a permutation π : [n] → [n] and a vector of output distributions (
The intuition behind this condition is that, at time t, player π(t) will publish Z π(t) . Since only results that improve on the "state of the art" can be published, we must have that the score s(Z π(t) ) increases with the time of publication t.
• For a collaboration outcome ω = (π, Z), the player who publishes at time t obtains a reward
where β ∈ (0, 1] is a discount factor which penalizes later publications. 4
• For each player i, we define
where {ŷ|x i } is the distribution ofŷ given that the i th dataset is x i . This models the "outside payoff" that player i could get if she does not collaborate and simply publishes on her own.
• Players may learn information not only from their own data, but also from the prior publications of others. A learning bound vector {λ π,i } π∈([n]→[n]),i∈[n] characterizes, for any publication order π, the maximum amount that each player i can learn from prior publications. This notion is defined formally in Section 2.3.
• We define CK to be the collection of all common-knowledge parameters of the model:
Examples
To illustrate the range of settings to which our model applies, we describe several concrete model instantiations.
Recall that our goal is to build mechanisms to enable collaborations by sharing data, in settings where such collaboration would be beneficial to all parties. Intuitively, such settings occur when the result that can be obtained based on the union of all players' datasets is "much better" than the results that can be obtained based on the individual datasets: in other words, the "size of the pie" to be split between the collaborating players is at least as large as the sum of the "slices" obtained by players working individually. This intuition is made rigorous in Lemma 10, where we discuss score functions which satisfy a superadditivity condition (Property 9).
Toy Example I: Secret-sharing. We begin with a "toy example" based on secret-sharing. This artificial first example is a dramatic illustration that the size of reward from collaboration can be much larger than the sum of individual rewards without collaborating.
Consider a stylized secret-sharing model with a secretŷ drawn uniformly at random from {0, 1} n . Each player's data consists of a share xi ∈ {0, 1} n such thatŷ = x1 ⊕ ... ⊕ xn be the secret the players are trying to reconstruct. The shares are correlated and drawn from a distribution X as follows:
• The last share is chosen such that xn =ŷ ⊕ x 1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ x n−1 .
The players want to learn f (X ) =ŷ. The score from publishing a distribution Y is s(Y) = H(ŷ) − H(ŷ|Y) where H(ŷ) = n is the entropy of the uniformly random stringŷ and H(ŷ|Y) is the entropy ofŷ given the distribution Y.
Without collaborating, each player i only knows a uniformly random string xi. Thus, H(ŷ|xi) = H(ŷ) = n and αi = H(ŷ|xi) − H(ŷ) = 0 for each player i. Consider the following collaboration mechanism:
• Each player contributes share x i to the mechanism.
• The mechanism computesŷ = x 1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ xn.
• The mechanism reveals i th digitŷ i to each player i.
When participating in this mechanism, the first player will publish a guess Y1 which is a distribution over {0, 1} n where the first bit of y ← Y1 is alwaysŷ1. All other players learnŷ1 from player 1's publication. Proceeding inductively, the i th player will publish a guess Yi such that the first i bits are correct, that is, (y1, . . . , yi) = (ŷ1, . . . ,ŷi) for any y ← Yi. Note that since αi = 0 for each player i, and H(ŷ|Yi) − H(ŷ|Yi−1) = 1 > αi, this mechanism incentivizes players to collaborate. The players want to learn the set of paths froms tot. That is, f (X (E)) is the set of paths in E froms tot. The score from publishing a distribution Z over edges is
In other words, the player's score is given by how many paths froms tot she knows with certainty to exist in E. In some cases, it may be that no player knows any path froms tot based only on her own data, as illustrated by the simple example in the diagram. Consider the following collaboration mechanism:
• Each player contributes their edges x i to the mechanism.
• The mechanism computes E = x 1 ∪ · · · ∪ xn, and the set P = {p 1 , . . . , p k } of paths in E that start ats and end att.
• The mechanism reveals the i th path p i to player i. If k < n, then the last k − n players will get no output. If k > n, the "extra" paths are allocated arbitrarily to players. 5
When participating in this mechanism, the first player will publish a guess Z1 which (always) samples the set {p1}. All other players learn p1 from player 1's publication. Then, the i th player will publish a guess Zi that samples the set {p1, . . . , pi}. As long as s(Zi) − s(Zi−1) ≥ αi for all i ∈ [n] (note that this is the case in the diagram), this mechanism incentivizes players to collaborate.
Example III: Correlating gene loci with disease
This example is inspired by successful GWAS studies to identify gene loci associated with schizophrenia. Consider a model where each player holds a set of patients' medical (and in particular, genetic) data xi which comes from some unknown patient distribution X . The players wish to learn the set f (X ) of gene loci that are correlated with the occurrence of schizophrenia in patients.
Let Γ be the set of all gene loci. For γ ∈ Γ, define Iγ to be 1 if γ ∈ f (X ) and 0 otherwise. The score from publishing a distribution Z over P(Γ) (i.e. over subsets of gene loci) could be: 6
This score function rewards players for assigning high probabilities to gene loci γ which are actually correlated with schizophrenia, and penalizes them for assigning high probabilities to those which are not. As in our previous examples, it turns out that in this setting, the reward that can be obtained based on pooling all the players' data is much greater than the sum of the rewards that could be obtained individually, as illustrated in Figure 1 . • Each player contributes some patient data x i .
• The mechanism computes Y * = {f (X )|x 1 , . . . , xn}, i.e. the distribution of f (X ) given all players' input data. Let Γ * = {γ ∈ Γ : Pr y←Y * [γ ∈ y] > 0.5}, that is, the set of gene loci that are more likely than not to be in f (X ), according to Y * .
• The mechanism reveals to player i the i th gene locus γ i in Γ * . If |Γ * | < n, then the last k − n players will get no output. If |Γ * | > n, the "extra" gene loci are allocated arbitrarily. 8 6 In practice, a more realistic scenario might be to model the extent to which particular gene loci are found to be correlated with the occurrence of schizophrenia, rather than classifying into binary categories "correlated" and "not correlated". This case could be modeled, for example, by letting f (X ) be a vector ((γ1, p1), . . . , (γ N , p N )) where Γ = {γ1, . . . , γ N } is the set of gene loci, and for each j ∈ [N ], pj is the correlation coefficient between γ1 and occurrence of schizophrenia. While Example IV presents the simpler "binary" model for ease of exposition, we remark that with appropriate modifications to the score function and mechanism, our model can accommodate the more complex case of estimating correlations, too. 7 This is just one example of a reasonable mechanism for this model; we do not mean to claim that it is a canonical or optimal one. There are many variants which could make sense: for example, a simple modification would be to change the threshold 0.5 in the second step. 8 As remarked in Footnote 5, it can be beneficial to allocate the "extra" gene loci in a way which is not arbitrary, but instead optimized for making collaboration possible. In this example, for simplicity, we allocate them arbitrarily.
When participating in this mechanism, the first player will publish a guess Z1 which (always) samples the set {γ1}. All other players learn γ1 from player 1's publication. Then, the i th player will publish a guess Zi that samples the set {γ1, . . . , γi}. Provided that s(Zi) − s(Zi−1) ≥ αi for all i ∈ [n] (note that Figure 1 depicts exactly such a scenario), this mechanism incentivizes players to collaborate.
Example IV: Statistical estimation
Our last example is one where -in contrast to the examples so far -there are decreasing marginal returns from adding new information, and thus collaboration will not be feasible.
We consider a simple Bayesian model where the distribution X is itself drawn from a "distribution over distributions" D. More concretely, each player i receives a vector of ki samples (xi,1, ..., x i,k i ) drawn independently from a normal distribution N (µ, σ 2 ) with unknown mean µ and known variance σ 2 . The mean µ is itself drawn from a commonly known prior distribution D = N (m, 1) with known mean m and variance 1. In this case, the ground set Xi
An estimator for µ is a random variableμ. The score of such a guessμ is s
It is well known that if we have a vector (xi,1, ..., x i,k i ) of random samples drawn from N (µ, σ), the estimator that minimizes the expected squared error to µ isμi = 1 k i k i j=1 xi,j. Note that this is a normal random variable since each xi,j is sampled from normal random variable. The expectation ofμi is 1 k i ·ki ·µ = µ and the variance ofμi is 1
If a player published by herself and did not collaborate, her reward would be the difference αi = σ 2 − 1 k i · σ 2 between the priorly known variance σ 2 and the variance 1 k i · σ 2 of player i's estimate. If the players collaborate, they can obtain the estimator
Note that in this case, the reward from an estimator only depends on the number of data points N used to construct this estimator (in the above notation, N = n i=1 ki). Furthermore, the reward R(N ) = σ 2 (1− 1 N ) that one could obtain with N data points is concave in N . Intuitively, if one only has N = 2 data points, and gets 10 new ones, those 10 new data points are very valuable. However, if one already has N = 2000000 data points and gets 10 new ones, those 10 new data points do not increase the score very much.
This setting is in contrast to our Example III, where the score seemed to increase in a convex way with the number of data points. Indeed, in this Bayesian example, we will always have that
In Section 2.5 we elaborate on why the above inequality is bad for collaboration. Intuitively, the left-hand side is the "size of the pie" if all players were to collaborate, and the right-hand side is the sum of the rewards that each player could receive on her own. The inequality implies there is no way to "slice the pie" so that every player has a bigger reward than the αi they can get without collaborating, and thus collaboration is impossible.
In this simple Bayesian example, the marginal value of extra information will be decreasing. This raises the interesting question of when the value of information is (and is not) not convex with the amount of information available. For example, consider machine learning: learning problems whose objectives can be stated as minimizing a convex loss function (or maximizing a concave value function) seem to induce natural score functions which do not have increasing marginal returns, so our model may be more applicable to problems with non-convex objectives. We remark that such non-convex learning problems, in which our model seems more applicable, are an area of interest in machine learning as solving them is lately becoming practical -we refer to Bengio and LeCun [5] for a more thorough discussion of this situation.
Data-sharing mechanisms
We now return to the general formulation of our collaboration model, and we seek to design a general data-sharing mechanism that takes as input the data of all the parties, computes an output distribution Yi ∈ ∆(Y ) for each i ∈ [n], and outputs Yi to each player i. The mechanism will output the Yi values to players sequentially, in a particular order. Upon receiving Yi, player i produces a public output (i.e a publication in the research collaboration example) which we denote by Zi ∈ Y .
We note that the public output of player i will not necessarily be the same as what was delivered by the data-sharing mechanism. Since player i wants to maximize her reward, she will publish a result Zi that will maximize her reward, conditional on the information she has at the time of publication. This information includes, in addition to the output Yi which she receives from the mechanism (and her knowledge of how the mechanism works 9 ), also her own dataset xi ∈ Xi, and all the outputs Zj of other players that published before her.
Recall that a collaboration outcome (π, Z) is given by a permutation π : [n] → [n] and a vector of output distributions Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) ∈ (∆(Y )) n such that s(Y0) < s(Z π(1) ) < · · · < s(Z π(n) ). We now define a proposed collaboration outcome (π, Y) as a permutation π : [n] → [n] together with a vector of proposed outputs Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ (∆(Y )) n generated by a data-sharing mechanism, satisfying s(Y0) < s(Y π(1) ) < · · · < s(Y π(n) ).
Recall also that we need to bound how much player i can learn from previous publications (and from her own dataset). We formally capture this with the notion of learning bound vectors λπ,i, which give an upper bound on the amount that player i learns from all previous publications when the order of publication is determined by permutation π. is a non-negative vector such that, if (π, Y) is a collaboration outcome proposed by a data-sharing mechanism, and Zi is the best (i.e. highest-scoring) distribution that player i can compute at the time π −1 (i) of her publication, then s(Zi) ≤ s(Yi) + λπ,i. Let Λ = R n!×n + denote the set of all learning bound vectors. 9 The mechanism description is common knowledge.
Definition 2. For a learning bound vector λ, the set of inferred output distributions derived from a proposed collaboration outcome (π, Y) is given by the following expression:
The intuition behind the above definition is that the amount of information that player π(t) (namely, the player who publishes at time t) can learn from prior outputs is measured by how much her score increases based on these prior outputs. This increase in score is bounded by λ π,π(t) . Thus, her eventual output will be some Z π(t) with score between s(Y π(t) ) and s(Y π(t) ) + λ π,π(t) .
Remark 1. In certain cases, λ π,π(t) measures exactly the amount of information that player π(t) can learn from her data. However, in our definition λ π,π(t) is an upper bound, and we emphasize that it may be a loose upper bound on the amount of information π(t) can learn. Our emphasis on this point comes from the following two reasons.
• In general, the vector λ ∈ R n!×n has very high dimension, and finding such a vector is infeasible. We may want to approximate this vector via a low-dimensional encoding (as we will do below, where we encode learning bounds using n-dimensional vectors). Since this low-dimensional encoding will lose information, we will not be able to represent λ π,π(t) exactly, but may get a reasonable upper bound on its value. • For some other settings, we may not be able to derive a precise expression for λ π,π(t) in terms of expectations, but we may still be able to derive an upper bound on the amount of information that player π(t) learns.
Now that we have established a formal definition of learning bound vectors, we define a data-sharing mechanism.
Definition 3. For model parameters CK, a data sharing mechanism is a function
which takes as inputs a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) of datasets and λ = (λπ,i) π∈([n]→[n]),i∈[n] a learning bound vector, and outputs an ordering π of the players and an output vector (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ (∆(Y )) n .
Remark 2. In the definition, for the sake of generality, we assume that the λ values are given as input to the mechanism. We remark that in certain settings, these values can be computed directly from the inputs xi of the parties, as discussed in the examples of Section 1.1.2. In this case, one may think of the mechanism M : X → ([n] → [n])×(∆(Y )) n as having input domain X only.
Collaborative equilibria
In our model, each research group π(t) will collaborate only if the credit they obtain from doing so is greater than the "outside option" reward α π(t) . We want to design a mechanism that guarantees collaboration whenever possible. Accordingly, we define the following equilibrium concept.
Definition 4. Let CK be the model parameters. Let ( x, λ) ∈ X × Λ and let (π, (Y1, . . . , Yn)) ∈ ([n] → [n]) × (∆(Y )) n . We say that (π, (Y1, . . . , Yn)) is a collaborative equilibrium with respect to ( x, λ) if for all inferred output distributions Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) ∈ I(π, (Y1, . . . , Yn)) and all t ∈ [n], it holds that Rt(π, Z) ≥ α π(t) .
Our goal is to find data-sharing mechanisms for which collaboration is an equilibrium. Intuitively, since we are searching for a feasible permutation over a very high-dimensional space (n!-dimensional, to be precise), the problem will be NP-complete (Theorem 13). However, there is a very natural condition on learning vectors for which we can reduce the dimension of the search space and efficiently find a collaborative equilibrium. The feasible case corresponds to the case where, for any player j, there is a bound on the amount of information that player j could teach any other players. We denote this bound by µj. Analogously, we could define µj to be a bound on the amount that player j can learn from any other player. In this work, we describe only the first case, when µj represents a bound on how much information player j can teach other players. The other case is analogous.
We define a learning bound vector to be n-dimensional if it satisfies the following property.
Definition 5. A learning vector λ ∈ Λ is n-dimensional if there is a non-negative vector (µ1, . . . , µn) such that λ π,π(t) = t−1 τ =1 µ π(τ ) . Let Λ1 ⊂ Λ denote the set of all n-dimensional learning vectors.
When λ is an n-dimensional learning vector, the total amount that player π(t) learns from all prior outputs is t−1 τ =1 µ π(τ ) . In this case, we can give necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium to exist (detailed in Theorem 6 below), provided that the following Output Divisibility Condition is satisfied. Output Divisibility Condition. Given the model parameters CK and any real 0 < δ ≤ 1, 10 there exists a distribution Y ∈ ∆(Y ) such that s(Y) = δ.
Remark 3. The above condition holds for many natural score functions. In general, score functions which reward "how close" a distribution is to the true valueŷ = f (X ) decrease (continuously) with the addition of random noise to a distribution. Provided that this holds, the condition can be satisfied by taking the optimal distribution {ŷ|X } and perturbing it with random noise: the exact amount of noise to be added depends on the desired value of δ. To give a concrete example: in Example III (Gene loci), the perturbed distribution could simply add noise to the probabilities that each gene locus is sampled. Here, "adding noise" can mean simply adding some η ← N (0, σ 2 ) to the relevant parameters, where the magnitude of σ depends on the precise formulation of the score function and the desired value of δ. Theorem 6. Suppose that the Output Divisibility Condition holds. Let x be a vector of inputs and λ be an n-dimensional learning bound vector. Let λ π,π(t) = t−1 τ =1 µ π(τ ) . Then for (π, Y) to be a collaborative equilibrium, it is necessary and sufficient that
Recall from the definition of the score function that the best score that can be attained given datasets x1, . . . , xn is equal to s({ŷ|x1, . . . , xn}). Based on Theorem 6, we can now characterize the datasets and learning bound vectors for which a collaborative equilibrium is possible. 10 Recall (from the model description) that s({ŷ|X }) = max Y∈∆(Y ) (s(Y)).
Without loss of generality, we assume in our analysis that the score function is normalized so that its maximum value s({ŷ|X }) = 1.
Definition 7. Let CK be the model parameters and let ( x, λ) ∈ X × Λ. We say that ( x, λ) supports a collaborative equilibrium if it holds that n t=1 α π(t) β t + n t=1 (n − t)µ π(t) ≤ s({ŷ|x1, . . . , xn}) − s(Y0).
How do the model parameters affect feasibility of collaborative equilibria?
Consider for a moment the simple case where β = 1 and λ = 0, that is, there is no discount factor and players do not learn from others' publications. We can show that in this case, if the score function satisfies the following Property 9, then it holds that for all x ∈ X, ( x, λ) supports a collaborative equilibrium. That is, in this simple case, the condition for ( x, λ) to support an equilibrium reduces to the superadditivity of the auxiliary score function s given in Property 9.
Definition 8. Let S be a set. A function f : S → R is superadditive if for all disjoint S1, S2 ⊆ S, it holds that f (S1) + f (S2) ≤ f (S1 ∪ S2).
Property 9 (Superadditive Differences).
Let CK be the model parameters. We define an auxiliary score function s : X1 · · · Xn → R+ which maps a set of datasets to a real-valued score, as follows:
where {ŷ|xi 1 , . . . , xi k } denotes the distribution ofŷ given that the datasets xi 1 , . . . , xi k were sampled 11 from X . The score function s satisfies the Superadditive Differences Property if s is superadditive.
We observe that this precisely captures the intuition initially described in Section 2.2, that our model is designed to promote collaboration in situations where the reward that can be obtained from pooling all players' data is more than the sum of the individual rewards that players can get.
Lemma 10. Let CK be model parameters such that β = 1, let x ∈ X be arbitrary, and let λ = 0 ∈ Λ. If s is a superadditive function on the input data, then ( x, λ) supports a collaborative equilibrium.
Finally, we remark that either decreasing the discount factor β or increasing the learning bound vector λ will make it harder to support a collaborative equilibrium (i.e. a lower value of β means there will be fewer ( x, λ) which support an equilibrium), since these cause the left-hand side of the inequality to increase. So, while superadditivity is a sufficient condition in the simplest case, we observe that determining which ( x, λ) support a collaborative equilibrium is a more complex problem when the model parameters are varied.
The polynomial-time mechanism
We show a polynomial-time mechanism that computes a collaborative equilibrium in the case that learning bounds are given by a n-dimensional vector, provided that the following Efficient Output Divisibility Condition is satisfied. This condition is a natural extension of the Output Divisibility Condition, which requires not only existence but also efficient computability of distributions with arbitrary score, while taking into account that the best possible score for given input datasets x1, . . . , xn is equal to s({ŷ|x1, . . . , xn}).
Efficient Output Divisibility Condition. Given model parameters CK, datasets x1, . . . , xn ∈ X, and any real 0 < δ < s({ŷ|x1, . . . , xn}), it is possible to efficiently compute a distribution Y ∈ ∆(Y ) such that s(Y) = δ.
Remark 4. The above condition holds for a wide variety of score functions, too: in particular, it holds for the class of score functions described in Remark 3. Suppose that the score function is continuous and decreases with the addition of random noise to a distribution. Then the condition can be satisfied by taking the "best computable" distribution {ŷ|x1, . . . , xn} and perturbing it with random noise: the amount of noise to add will depend on the desired value of δ.
Theorem 11. Suppose the Efficient Output Divisibility Condition holds. Then there is a polynomial-time mechanism SHARE-DATA : X × Λ1 that, given inputs ( x, µ) where µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) represents a n-dimensional learning vector, outputs a collaborative equilibrium (π, Y) whenever an equilibrium is supported by the inputs ( x, µ) (as defined in Definition 7), and outputs NONE otherwise.
Algorithm 1 SHARE-DATA((x1, . . . , xn), (µ1, . . . , µn)) 1. Let Y * = {ŷ|x 1 , . . . , xn} and δ * = s(Y 0 ).
Construct a complete weighted bipartite graph
Let M be the minimum-weight perfect matching on G. For each node t ∈ R, let π(t) ∈ L be the node that it is matched with. If the weight of M is larger than δ * , output NONE. Else, define δ π(n) = δ * , Y π(n) = Y * . 4. For t from n to 2:
be such that s(Y π(t−1) ) = δ π(t−1) .
5.
Output ω = (π, (Y π(1) , . . . , Y π(n) )).
General NP-completeness
One may wonder if we can get an efficient mechanism for learning vectors which are not n-dimensional. We show that this is unlikely, since finding a collaborative equilibrium is NP-complete even under a weak generalization of n-dimensional learning vectors.
Definition 12. We say that a learning vector λ ∈ Λ is n 2 -dimensional if there exists a non-negative matrix (µi,j) (i,j)∈[n]× [n] such that λ π,π(t) = t−1 τ =1 µ π(t),π(τ ) . We denote by Λ2 ⊂ Λ the set of all n 2 -dimensional learning vectors.
When λ is an n 2 -dimensional learning vector, the amount that player π(t) learns from π(τ )'s output is bounded above by µ π(t),π(τ ) . Thus, the total amount that player π(t) learns from all prior outputs is t−1 τ =1 µ π(t),π(τ ) . The corresponding necessary condition for a collaborative equilibrium to be supported by some ( x, λ) is that there is a permutation π such that n t=1 α π(t) β t + n t=1 s>t µ π(s),π(t) ≤ s({ŷ|x1, . . . , xn}) − s(Y0).
We show that even checking whether this condition holds is NP-complete.
Theorem 13. Given model parameters CK, input datasets (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X, and a n 2 -dimensional learning bound vector (µi,j) (i,j)∈[n]×[n] , it is NP-complete to decide whether there exists π such that Proof. To show that the problem is NP-hard, we reduce it to the minimum weighted feedback arc set problem. The proof is given in our full version [1] .
We have shown that in our model of scientific collaboration, it can indeed be very beneficial to all parties involved to collaborate under certain ordering functions, and such collaboration outcomes can be efficiently computed under certain realistic conditions (but probably not in general).
ORDERED MPC
We introduce formal definitions of ordered MPC and associated notions of fairness and ordered output delivery, and give protocols that realize these notions. Our definitions build on the standard security notion 12 for traditional MPC.
Throughout this work, we consider computationally bounded (rushing) adversaries in a synchronous complete network, and we assume the players are honest-but-curious, since any protocol secure against honest-but-curious players can be transformed into one secure against malicious players [12] .
Let f be an arbitrary n-ary function and p be an n-ary function that outputs permutation [n] → [n]. An ordered MPC protocol is executed by n parties, where each party i ∈ [n] has a private input xi ∈ {0, 1} * , who wish to securely compute f (x1, . . . , xn) = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ ({0, 1} * ) n where yi is the output of party i. Moreover, the parties are to receive their outputs in a particular ordering dictated by p(x1, . . . , xn) = π ∈ ([n] → [n]). That is, for all i < j, party π(i) must receive his output before party π(j) receives her output. Note that the output ordering π is data-dependent, as p is a function of the parties' inputs.
Following [12] , the security of ordered MPC with respect to a functionality f and permutation function p is defined by comparing the execution of a protocol to an ideal process F Ordered-MPC where the outputs and ordering are computed by a trusted party who sees all the inputs. An ordered MPC protocol F is considered to be secure if for any real-world adversary A attacking the real protocol F , there exists an ideal adversary S in the ideal process whose outputs (views) are indistinguishable from those of A. Note that this implies that no player learns more information about the other players' inputs than can be learned from his own input and output, and his own position in the output delivery order. The latter condition is important because the output ordering depends on parties' private inputs, and thus we require that the protocol reveals as little information as possible about the ordering.
Many rather than one view. In the ordered MPC setting, the ideal adversary S and the real-world adversary A each output a view after each output phase. This is in contrast to standard MPC, where the adversaries simply output one view at the end of the protocol execution.
Ideal functionality F Ordered-MPC
In the ideal model, a trusted third party T is given the inputs, computes the functions f, p on the inputs, and outputs to each player i his output y i in the order prescribed by the ordering function. In addition, we model an ideal process adversary S who attacks the protocol by corrupting players in the ideal setting. Public parameters. κ ∈ N, the security parameter; n ∈ N, the number of parties; f : ({0, 1} * ) n → ({0, 1} * ) n , the function to compute; and p : ({0, 1} * ) n → ([n] → [n]), the ordering function. Private parameters. Each player i ∈ [n] has input x i ∈ {0, 1} * . 1. Input. Each player i sends his input x i to T .
2.
Computation. T computes (y 1 , . . . , yn) = f (x 1 , . . . , xn) and π = p(x 1 , . . . , xn).
3.
Output. The output proceeds in n sequential output rounds. At the start of the j th round, T sends the output value out i,j to each party i, where out j,j = y π(j) and out i,j = ⊥ for all i = j. When party π(j) receives his output, he responds to T with the message ack. (The players who receive ⊥ are not expected to respond.) Upon receipt of the ack, T proceeds to the (j +1) th round -or, if j = n, then the protocol terminates.
Output of views.
At each output round, after receiving his message from T , each party produces an output, as follows. Each uncorrupted party i outputs y i if he has already received his output, or ⊥ if he has not. Each corrupted party outputs ⊥. Additionally, the adversary S outputs an arbitrary function of the information that he has learned during the execution of the ideal protocol. Let the output of party i in the j th round be denoted by V i,j , and let the view outputted by S in the j th round be denoted by V S,j . Let V ideal Ordered-MPC denote the collection of all views for all output rounds:
V ideal
Ordered-MPC = (V S,1 , V 1,1 , . . . , V n,1 ), . . . , (V S,n , V 1,n , . . . , Vn,n) .
(If the protocol is terminated early, then views for rounds which have not yet been started are taken to be ⊥.) Definition 14 (Security). A multi-party protocol F is said to securely realize F Ordered-MPC , if the following conditions hold.
1. The protocol description specifies n check-points C 1 , . . . , Cn corresponding to events during the execution of the protocol. In the context of ordered MPC, the standard guaranteed output delivery notion is insufficient. Instead, we define ordered output delivery, which requires in addition that all parties receive their outputs in the order prescribed by p.
Take any ppt adversary
Definition 15 (Ordered output delivery). An ordered MPC protocol satisfies ordered output delivery if for any inputs x1, . . . , xn, functionality f , and ordering function p, it holds that all parties receive their outputs before protocol termination, and moreover, if π(i) < π(j), then party i receives his output before party j receives hers, where π = p(x1, . . . , xn).
We also define a natural relaxation of the fairness requirement for ordered MPC, called prefix-fairness. Although it is known that fairness is impossible for general functionalities in the presence of a dishonest majority, we show in the next subsection that prefix-fairness can be achieved even when a majority of parties are corrupt. We emphasize that this notion relaxes only the fairness requirement: that is, prefix-fair protocols satisfy full privacy (and correctness) guarantees.
Definition 16 (Prefix-fairness). An ordered MPC protocol is prefix-fair if for any inputs x1, . . . , xn, the set of parties who have received their outputs when the protocol terminates (or aborts) is a prefix of (π(1), . . . , π(n)), where π = p(x1, . . . , xn) is the permutation induced by the inputs.
Prefix-fairness can be useful, for example, in settings where it is more important for one party to receive the output than the other; or where there is some prior knowledge about the trustworthiness of each party (so that more trustworthy parties may receive their outputs first).
Construction
Ordered MPC is achievable by using standard protocols for general MPC, as described in Protocol 1 below. The protocol has n sequential output phases, so that the n outputs can be issued in order. A subtle point is that because the ordering is a function of the input data, knowledge of the ordering may reveal information about the inputs. Thus, we have to "mask" the output values such that each party only learns the minimal possible amount of information about the ordering: namely, his own position in the ordering. 2. Outputting y 1 , . . . , yn in n phases: In the i th output phase, player π −1 (i) will learn his output. In phase i the parties run a new instance of a general secure MPC protocol such that:
• Player j's inputs to the protocol are: the shares of y and π that he got in step 1, and a random string r i,j . • The functionality computed is:
for j from 1 to n: if π(j) = i then z i,j := y j ⊕ r i,j else z i,j = ⊥ ⊕ r i,j . output z i = (z i,1 , . . . , z i,n ). where ⊥ is a special string outside f 's output domain.
• To recover his output, each player j computes y i,j = z i,j ⊕ r i,j for all i. By construction, there is exactly one i ∈ [n] for which y i,j = ⊥, and that is equal to the output value y j for player j.
Check-points. There are n check-points. For i ∈ [n], the checkpoint C i is at the end of the i th output phase, when z i is learned by all players.
In case of abort. When running the protocol for the honest majority setting, the honest players continue until the end of the protocol regardless of other players' behavior. When running the protocol for dishonest majority, if any party aborts in an output phase 14 , then the honest players abort before the next phase.
Theorem 17. Protocol 1 securely realizes F Ordered-MPC .
Theorem 18. In the case of honest majority, Protocol 1 achieves fairness. In the dishonest majority setting, prefixfairness is achieved.
TIMED-DELAY MPC
In this section, we implementing time delays between different players receiving their outputs. The model is exactly as before, with n players wishing to compute a function f (x1, . . . , xn) in an ordering prescribed by p(x1, . . . , xn)except that now, there is an additional requirement of a delay after each player receives his output and before the next player receives her output. To realize the timed-delay MPC functionality, we make use of time-lock and time-line puzzles, which are introduced in Section 4.2.1.
Ideal functionality with time delays
We measure time delay in units of computation, rather than seconds of a clock: that is, rather than making any assumption about global clocks (or synchrony of local clocks) 15 , we measure time by the evaluations of a particular function (on random inputs), which we call the clock function.
Ideal functionality F Timed-MPC
In the ideal model, a trusted third party T is given the inputs, computes the functions f, p on the inputs, and outputs to each player i his output y i in the order prescribed by the ordering function. Moreover, T imposes delays between the issuance of one party's output and the next. In addition, we model an ideal process adversary S who attacks the protocol by corrupting players in the ideal setting. Public parameters. κ ∈ N, the security parameter; n ∈ N, the number of parties; f : ({0, 1} * ) n → ({0, 1} * ) n , the function to be computed; p : ({0, 1} * ) n → ([n] → [n]), the ordering function; and G = G(κ) ∈ N, the number of time-steps between the issuance of one party's output and the next. Private parameters. Each player i ∈ [n] has input x i ∈ {0, 1} * . 13 The standard definition of a secret-sharing scheme can be found in our full version [1] . 14 Each output phase consists of an execution of the underlying general MPC protocol. If a party aborts at any time during (and before the end of) the execution of the underlying general MPC protocol, this fact will be detected by all honest parties by the end of the phase. 15 A particular issue that arises when considering a clock-based definition is that it is not clear that we can reasonably assume or prove that clocks are in synchrony between the real and ideal world -but this seems necessary in order to prove security by simulation in the ideal functionality. We remark that if one is happy to assume the existence of a global clock (or synchrony of local clocks), then there are other ways to implement timed-delay MPC which sidestep many of the issues inherent in the arguably more realistic model where clocks may not be perfectly synchronized between different (adversarial) parties. One example is the "Bitcoin model" where the assumption is that the Bitcoin block-chain can serve as a global clock: in this model, existing protocols such as [6] implement some time-delays in MPC, and it seems likely that such protocols can be adapted to achieve our notion of timed-delay MPC.
1. Input. Each player i sends his input x i to T . If, instead of sending his input, any player sends the message quit, then the computation is aborted.
2.
3.
Output. The output proceeds in n sequential output phases. At each phase j, T waits for G time-steps, then sends the j th output, y π(j) , to party π(j).
4.
Output of views. At the end of each output phase, each party produces an output as follows. Each uncorrupted party i outputs y i as his view if he has already received his output, or ⊥ if he has not. Each corrupted party outputs ⊥. Additionally, the adversary S outputs an arbitrary function of the information that he has learned during the execution of the ideal protocol, after each check-point. Let the output of party i in the j th round be denoted by V i,j , and let the view outputted by S in the j th round be denoted by V S,j . Let V ideal Timed-MPC denote the collection of all views for all output phases:
Timed-MPC = (V S,1 , V 1,1 , . . . , V n,1 ), . . . , (V S,n , V 1,n , . . . , Vn,n) .
For an algorithm A, let the run-time 16 of A on input inp be denoted by timeA(inp). If A is probabilistic, the run-time will be a distribution over the random coins of A. Note that the exact run-time of an algorithm will depend on the underlying computational model in which the algorithm is run. In this work, all algorithms are assumed to be running in the same underlying computational model, and our definitions and results hold regardless of the specific computational model employed.
Definition 19 (Security).
A multi-party protocol F (with parameters κ, n, f, p, G) securely realizes F Timed-MPC if the following conditions hold.
1. The protocol description specifies n check-points C 1 , . . . , Cn corresponding to events during protocol execution.
2. There exists a "clock function" g such that between any two consecutive checkpoints C i , C i+1 during an execution of F , any one of the parties (in the real world) must be able to locally run Ω(G) sequential evaluations of g on random inputs. g may also be a protocol (involving n ≤ n parties) rather than a function, in which case we instead require that any subset consisting of n parties must be able to run Ω(G) sequential executions of g (on random inputs) over the communication network being used for the main multi-party protocol F . Then, we say that F is "clocked by g".
3. Take any ppt adversary A attacking the protocol F by corrupting a subset of players S ⊂ [n], which outputs an arbitrary function V A,j of the information that it has learned in the protocol execution after each check-point C j . Let
. . , V n,1 ), . . . , (V A,n , V 1,n , . . . , Vn,n)
be the tuple consisting of the adversary A's outputted views along with the views of the real-world parties as specified in the ideal functionality description. Then there is a ppt ideal adversary S which, attacking F Timed-MPC by corrupting the same subset S of players, can output views V S,1 , . . . , V S,n (at check-points C 1 , . . . , Cn respectively) such that for each j ∈ [n], it holds that
for any distinguisher D such that
when V is the distribution of views outputted by A or S (that is, for V ∈ {(V S,j , V 1,j , . . . , V n,j ), (V A,j , V 1,j , . . . , V n,j )}), and G is the algorithm that computes the function g sequentially on G random inputs.
Realizing timed-delay MPC
A simple protocol for securely realizing timed-delay MPC is to implement delays by running G "dummy rounds" of communication between issuing outputs to different players. In our full version, we formally describe such a protocol and prove that it securely realizes F Timed-MPC .
However, a downside of the simple solution above is that it requires all (honest) parties to be online and communicating until the last player receives his output. To address this, we propose an alternative solution based on timed-release cryptography, at the cost of an additional assumption that all players have comparable computing speed (within a logarithmic factor).
Informally, a time-lock puzzle is a primitive which allows "locking" of data, such that it will be released after a prespecified time delay, and no earlier. Our next protocol, instead of issuing outputs to players in the clear, gives to each party his output locked into a time-lock puzzle; and in order to enforce the desired ordering, the delays required to unlock the puzzles are set to be an increasing sequence. We first give the definition of time-lock puzzles (in Section 4.2.1) then describe and prove security of our time-lock-based protocol (in Section 4.2.2).
Time-lock puzzles
The delayed release of data in MPC protocols can be closely linked to the problem of "timed-release crypto" in general, which was introduced by [17] and constructed first by [19] with their proposal of time-lock puzzles. We assume time-lock puzzles with a particular structure (that is present in all known implementations): namely, the passage of "time" will be measured by sequential evaluations of a function (TimeStep) . Unlocking a t-step time-lock puzzle can be considered analogous to following a chain of t pointers, at the end of which there is a special value xt (e.g. a decryption key) that allows retrieval of the locked data. • Lock(1 κ , d, t) takes parameters κ ∈ N the security parameter, d ∈ {0, 1} the data to be locked, and t ∈ N the number of steps needed to unlock the puzzle, and outputs a time-lock puzzle P = (x, t, b, a) ∈ {0, 1} n × N × {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n where , n, n , n = poly(κ). • TimeStep(1 κ , x , a ) takes parameters κ ∈ N the security parameter, a bit-string x ∈ {0, 1} n , and auxiliary information a , and outputs a bit-string x ∈ {0, 1} n . • Unlock(1 κ , x , b ) takes parameters κ ∈ N the security parameter, a bit-string x ∈ {0, 1} n , and auxiliary information b ∈ {0, 1} n , and outputs some data d ∈ {0, 1} .
To unclutter notation, we will sometimes omit the initial security parameter of these functions (writing e.g. simply Lock(d, t)). We now define some auxiliary functions. For a time-lock puzzle scheme T = (Lock, TimeStep, Unlock) and i ∈ N, let IterateTimeStep T i denote the following function: IterateTimeStep T (i, x, a) = TimeStep(TimeStep(. . . (TimeStep(x, a) , a) . . . ), a) i .
Define FullUnlock T to be the following function:
FullUnlock T ((x, t, b, a)) = Unlock(IterateTimeStep T (t, x, a) , b), that is, the function that should be used to unlock a timelock puzzle outputted by Lock.
The following definitions formalize correctness and security for time-lock puzzle schemes. 
Protocol based on time-lock puzzles
Because of the use of time-lock puzzles by different parties in the protocol that follows, we require an additional assumption that all players have comparable computing power (within a logarithmic factor).
where each r i is a random string provided as input randomness by party i. Outputs. For each i ∈ [n], the puzzle P i is outputted to party i. The players all receive their respective outputs at the same time, then recovers his output y i by solving his time-lock puzzle, and finally "unmasking" the result by XORing with his random input r i . Check-points. There are n check-points. For i ∈ [n], the checkpoint C i is the event of party π(i) learning his eventual output y π(i) (i.e. when he finishes solving his time-lock puzzle).
For the following theorem, we assume that each player i uses the optimal algorithm to solve his puzzle Pi that outputs the correct answer. Without this assumption, any further protocol analysis would not make sense: there can always be a "lazy" player who willfully uses a very slow algorithm to solve his puzzle, who will as a result learn his eventual output much later in the order than he could otherwise have done. The property that we aim to achieve is that every player could learn his output at his assigned position in the ordering π, with appropriate delays before and after he learns his output.
Theorem 23. Suppose that the Relative-Delay Assumption holds, and each player i uses the optimal algorithm to solve his puzzle Pi that outputs (with overwhelming probability) the correct answer. Then, Protocol 2 securely realizes F Timed-MPC when there is an honest majority.
A few remarks are in order. In Protocol 2, all the parties can stop interacting as soon as all the puzzles are outputted. When the locking algorithm Lock(d, t) has run-time that is independent of the delay t, the run-time of Protocol 2 is also independent of the delay parameters. (This is achievable using the [19] time-lock construction, for example.)
In our full version, we introduce the more general, novel definition of time-line puzzles, which can be useful for locking together many data items with different delays for a single recipient, or for locking data for a group of people. In the latter case, it becomes a concern that computation speed will vary between parties: indeed, the scheme will be unworkable if some parties have orders of magnitude more computing power than others, so some assumption is required on the similarity of computing power among parties. When a time-line puzzle is given to a single recipient, then no additional assumptions are required.
We remark that time-line puzzles could be used (instead of a set of time-lock puzzles) to realize Protocol 2 more efficiently: the time required to generate a time-line puzzle is dependent only on the longest delay tn, whereas the time required to generate n separate time-lock puzzles depends on the sum of all the delays, t1 + · · · + tn. More generally, we believe that time-line puzzles may be of independent interest as a timed-release primitive.
